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ed Growth
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1 Introduction
According to Unied Growth Theory (Galor, 2011),1 the contemporary distribution of
the standard of living across countries, and, possibly, across regions within countries, can
be explained by the di¤erential timing of the transition from an agricultural epoch of
Malthusian stagnation in income per capita to a modern industrialized era of sustained
economic growth. In this paper, we are concerned with a particular determinant agri-
cultural resource abundance  in causing the di¤erential timing of the transition from
stagnation to growth and, thus, the contemporary distribution of the standard of living.
However, whether agricultural resource abundance is a blessing for industrialization2 gen-
erates controversy in the literature. One view is that agricultural advantage is good for
industrialization (Rostow, 1960; Nurkse, 1953).3 Another view argues that more agri-
cultural resource is a curse for small open economies, although it is a blessing for closed
economies (Matsuyama, 1992). Yanagawa (1996) shows that the answer to the question
is not unique.4
The controversy, theoretically, lies in whether agricultural resource abundance can
allow one economy to solve the food problem so as to release resources from the agricultural
to the manufacturing sector that is the engine of modern growth (see Schultz, 1953; 1968;
Rostow, 1960; Nurkse, 1953). However, existing theories on agricultural resources neglect
fertility choice and weather. Peoples fertility choice and thus total population respond
to agricultural resources that are essential for the production of survival good, food. How
fertility responds to agricultural resources (e.g., Malthus, 1798; Strulik and Weisdorf,
2008) would determine whether more resources could be released from agriculture. We
may get di¤erent predictions depending on how to dene agricultural resource abundance:
in absolute amount or in per capita term. This also decides how one empirically measures
agricultural resources in testing theories.
To incorporate the role of fertility, we use the unied growth theory to study the
role of agricultural resource abundance in causing the di¤erential timing of the transition
from stagnation to growth. We show that quality-adjusted agricultural land abundance
detailed later  really does confer a type of resource curse, in that it prolongs the
tenure of an economy in the Malthusian regime. Resultantly, we lend new insights to
1See Galor (2011) for a thorough survey of the literature on unied growth theory. Because of his
excellent discussion of it, we shall omit detailed references to the literature.
2In this paper, industrialization does not merely refer to industrial revolution. Industrialization here
refers to the structural transformation in which the sectoral composition of economic activity shifts from
agriculture towards industry and services (see Kuznets, 1966).
3Nurkse (1953) and Rostow (1960) argue that an increase in agricultural productivity is necessary for
industrialization. They suggest that increases in agricultural resource abundance allow solving the food
problem so that resources can be released from the agricultural to the manufacturing sector.
4Recently, Galor et al. (2008) emphasize that equality vs. inequality of the distribution of land
ownership instead of abundance vs. scarcity of land matters for development.
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Unied Growth Theory by elucidating agricultural resource abundance as a particular
determinant of the di¤erential timing of the transition from stagnation to growth and,
thus, the contemporary distribution of the standard of living.
Specically, we build a two-sector model of farmland resources with fertility choice and
weather based on Matsuyama (1992) and Strulik and Weisdorf (2008). We will discuss
possible extensions in the line of human capital accumulation by augmenting parental
preferences to allow for a quality-quantity trade-o¤ over children (see, e.g., Becker and
Lewis, 1973; Galor and Weil, 2000). Our model is a two-period overlapping generation
one with two sectors: agriculture and manufacturing. The engine of growth is learning-by-
doing in manufacturing as in Matsuyama. People have quasi-linear preference on children
as in Strulik and Weisdorf.
If besides the Malthusian preventive check in Strulik and Weisdorf (that is, fertility
only responds to the relative price of food that is determined by the amount of farmland),
peoples taste for o¤spring is not directly a¤ected by weather, then the main predictions
of the model would be the same as those based on Matsuyama: there is a land curse in a
small open economy, and good weather would also be a curse for the small open economy.
If besides the Malthusian preventive check in Strulik and Weisdorf, peoples taste for
o¤spring is directly decreased by weather, then the main predictions of the model would
remain similar to those based on Matsuyama.
If besides the Malthusian preventive check, peoples taste for o¤spring is directly in-
creased by weather given Strulik and Weisdorfs argument that peoples taste for children
depends on latitude and weather is one important geographical characteristic of latitude.
The model shows that the relative price of food is negatively related to per capita farm-
land. Higher per capita farmland is a curse for a small open economy because it decreases
the relative price of food and this way generates comparative advantage in agriculture.
In contrast, it is a blessing in a closed economy. These are also predicted by Matsuyama
(1992). The model, however, has new predictions concerning the role of weather in growth
and the channel for weather to impact growth. In a closed economy, a good weather shock
increases farmland (quantity and quality). This is initially a blessing because the relative
price of food would drop, which is good for industrialization as argued by Rostow (1960)
and Nurkse (1953). Subsequently, fertility rate will increase. Due to the Malthusian
preventive check and weathers direct e¤ect on peoples taste for children, fertility will in-
crease more than the farmland, which concurs with Malthus (1798). This results in lower
per capita farmland than before the shock, which causes the relative price of food to be
higher than before the shock. The higher relative price of food hurts industrialization.
Hence, a good weather shock is a curse in a closed economy. However, when the econ-
omy is small and open, the higher relative price of food from lower per capita farmland
results in comparative disadvantage in agriculture. By specializing in manufacturing, the
small open economy enjoys the blessing from good weather. It is neither population nor
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farmland, instead it is per capita farmland (farmland divided by population) the channel
through which good weather positively promotes industrialization.
Are our results robust to extensions of the consideration of human capital accumu-
lation by augmenting parental preferences to allow for a quality-quantity trade-o¤ over
children (e.g., Becker and Lewis, 1973; Galor and Weil, 2000)? As discussed later on,
the results would hinge on structural parameters on the production function and parental
preference. Although these extensions would be important, contradicting predictions may
be inevitable. Therefore, we expect future rigorous empirical studies to check whether
our theoretical predictions are supported by data. And our model provides guidance for
relevant empirical analysis, as detailed in section 3.2.
As is known to all, four Asian tigers and the Peoples Republic of China have achieved
impressive growth in the past several decades. It is also shown that the regional growth
inequality among those economies also arouses attention. For instance, Demurger et al.
(2002) show that the di¤erence in annual growth rates between the fastest and slowest
growing provinces in China over the period of 1979-1998 is 6.2 percentage points. The
success of these economies usually began with the land reform in agriculture that empha-
sizes the equal distribution of land. However, even if land is equally distributed for fast
industrialization, the regions within those economies may vary in land abundance, which
may cause divergence in growth performance in the process of development. This regional
growth inequality comes from di¤erences in comparative advantage and specialization due
to variation in the natural endowment of land instead of the distribution of land, which
justies the real world relevance of our theoretical analysis.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes and solves the model.
Section 3 discusses possible extensions and the relevance to empirics. Section 4 concludes.
2 A Two-Sector Model of Endogenous Growth with Fertility
and Weather
We build our model following Matsuyama (1992) and Strulik and Weisdorf (2008). We
study a small open economy that does not a¤ect prices in other countries. The small
open economy consists of two sectors: agriculture and manufacturing. Let pt denote its
relative price of food (the price of manufactured goods is 1). Farmland is included as one
input of agricultural production.5 The population size of the small open economy is lt.
Labor is assumed to be immobile across countries.
2.1 A bench mark model with fertility choice but no weather
It is a two-period overlapping generations model. The preference structure follows Strulik
and Weisdorf (2008). People consume 1 unit of food only when young. Production and
5Farmland in this paper mimics the agricultural productivity in Matsuyama (1992).
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reproduction assumed to be asexual take place when old. Population evolves according
to lt+1 = ntlt, where nt is the gross rate of population that is assumed to equal fertility
rate. For a representative agent who is born at time t, her preference is given by Ut =
mt+ ln (nt), where mt is the amount of manufacturing good she consumes and nt is the
number of children she reproduces when old.  governs her taste for children.6
The representative agents budget constraint is ptnt+mt = wt, where wt is his income
(in terms of manufactures). The demand for o¤spring is
nt =

pt
: (1)
This is just Malthus(1978) preventive check hypothesis in Strulik and Weisdorf (2008).
The production side of the model follows Matsuyama (1992). Manufacturing employs
labor only, while agriculture uses both labor and farmland for production:
Y Mt = MtF (t) (2)
Y At =
 t
lt
G (1  t) (3)
where t is the fraction of labor employed in manufacturing and  t is the endowment
of farmland (the product of the quantity and the quality of farmland), and lt is total
population.7 We assume: F (0) = G(0) = 0; F 0; G0 > 0; F 00; G00 < 0.
Following Matsuyama (1992), we assume the engine of growth is learning-by-doing in
the manufacturing sector. And the learning-by-doing does not spill over across countries.
Manufacturing productivity Mt is endogenous and evolves over time according to
Mt+1  Mt =

Mt = Y
M
t )

Mt
Mt
= F (t) (4)
2.1.1 The equilibrium of the world economy
The world economy di¤ers from the small open economy only in that its farmland endow-
ment and population are Tt and Lt, respectively. The consumers in the world share the
same preference, so the equilibrium of the world economy mimics that of a representative
closed economy. Competition in labor market implies8
6 makes sure that agriculture always exists. Its role is the same as the subsistence level of consump-
tion (also denoted as ) in Matsuyama (1992).
7We can write the production functions in terms of the amount of labor as: Y At = G (LA; Land) and
YMt =MtF (LM ), where LA and LM are the amount of labor in agriculture and manufacture respectively.
Suppose G and F are homogenous of degree 1, then we can divide both of them by total labor, L. And
the properties of the model will be the same, but we can get agricultural output as a function of t and
per capita land.
8The follows Matsuyama (1992). Matsuyama argues that, the wage-gap between manufacturing and
agriculture and the labor migration from agriculture to manufacturing may be substantial in reality, but
they would not a¤ect the predictions of the model and are assumed away for simplicity.
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pt
Tt
Lt
G0 [(1  t)] =MtF 0 (t) (5)
One can observe that, the relative price of food depends on per capita farmland, which
is di¤erent from Matsuyama (1992) who predicts that the relative price of food depends
on total farmland (given xed population). The price of food depends on the relative
(i.e. per capita) endowment of farmland makes sense. We can use the following case.
If two identical countries got merged into one, the relative price of food should be same
as before, all else equal. But Matsuyamas model would predict that the merger of two
identical countries would decrease the relative price of food, which is unlikely.9
The market clearing condition for the food market implies Y At = ntLt, where ntLt is
the total demand for food. Using equation (3), we have
1
G (1  t) =
Tt
ntL2t
: (6)
Equations (1), (5) and (6) govern the equilibrium of the model, from which we can
solve the three unknown variables of pt, nt and t. We can get
G0 (1  t)
G (1  t) 
1
MtF 0 (t)
=
1
Lt
: (7)
Depending on the functional forms that determine how the relative price of food
to change, the model predicts two long-run equilibria. One mimics those in Strulik and
Weisdorf (2008) and Jones (1995): there is no long-run productivity growth, with di¤erent
mechanism. In this equilibrium, the population explodes given initially nt > 1, so we need
the whole labor force to work in agriculture to support the exploding population. Given
the food market clearing condition (the maximum of food the land can produce), in the
end, population growth drops to unity, and t decreases to zero (that is, no productivity
growth in manufacturing, F (0) = 0). The second has a decreasing rate of population
growth (nt decreases over time) beginning from nt < 1. As population shrinks, we need
smaller share of population working in agriculture. In the end, t converges to one, and
we have the maximum rate of productivity growth: F (1).
In the transitional path, the left-hand-side of equation (8) is a monotonically increasing
function of t, so equation (7) has a unique solution for t (

t ). The world manufacturing
productivity grows at the rate of F (t ).
2.1.2 Per capita farmland endowment and economic growth
It is assumed that both agricultural and manufactured goods are traded as homogenous
9Matsuyama (1992) has a xed population in his model, so he discusses that agricultural productivity
is a¤ected by land endowment. Therefore, land endowment there a¤ects the relative price of food.
Without considering fertility and population, the land endowment in his model is open to interpretation.
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goods with equal prices in all countries. The other countries, excluding the small open
economy, consist of the rest of the world. Taking the ratios of each side of equation (5)
and that of the rest of the world to remove the relative price of manufacturing good,
equation (5) becomes
F 0 (t)
G0 [(1  t)] =
( t=lt)M

t
(Tt=Lt)Mt
F 0 (t )
G0 [(1  t )]
(8)
where the variables with a star superscript or in capital letters denote the world (or the
rest of the world). At the initial period, t = 0, all else equal, it is obvious that
0 S 0 if and only if
(T0=L0)
M0
S ( 0=l0)
M0
: (9)
At t = 0, we assume that the rest of the world di¤ers from the small open economy
only in their amount of per capita farmland, that is, their manufacturing productivity is
assumed to be equal: M0 = M0. According to equation (5), if the small open economy
has higher per capita farmland, its relative price of food will be lower. Hence it will have
comparative advantage in agriculture and specialize in it. In other words, the small open
economy will have a smaller share of labor employed by manufacturing than the rest of the
world. Di¤erentiating equation (8) further shows that the initial comparative advantage
of the small open economy will intensify over time, and the manufacturing employment
share of the economy will drop faster. Given the engine of growth is learning-by-doing in
manufacturing, the growth rate of the economy will be even lower when compared with
those economies that have lower initial amount of per capita farmland.
Until now, the model, except for the long-run equilibria, predicts the same as Mat-
suyama (1992). Suppose initially there is a positive shock in farmland endowment,  t.
Before the fertility rate can change, according to equation (5), this would cause lower
relative price of food (suppose price adjusts faster than fertility). But this turns out to
be a curse because, according to equation (9), the small open economy would have com-
parative advantage in agriculture. Then, fertility rate responds. We combine equations
(1) and (5) to eliminate the relative price of food:
nt =
G0 (1  t)
MtF 0 (t)
  t
Lt
  (10.1)
Following an increase in farmland, the fertility rate tends to increase one-for-one (the
middle term in the right-hand-side (RHS) of equation 10.1). However, having comparative
advantage in agriculture causes t to decrease. This decreases the rst term in the RHS
of equation (10.1) since F 00 < 0, G00 < 0 andMt is increasing. This tends to lower fertility
rate. In sum, the increase in fertility is smaller than that in farmland, so the small open
economy will always have higher per capita farmland than the rest of world. Hence, it
will always have comparative advantage in agriculture. More total farmland is a curse,
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as predicted by Matsuyama (1992), and it does not matter whether one di¤erentiates
between total and per capita farmland. Therefore, if we model fertility choice fully as a
Malthusian preventive check as in Strulik and Weisdorf (2008), the model predicts the
same as the Matsuyama (1992) model that neglects fertility choice.
Although weather will be introduced in next section di¤erently, it is desirable to dis-
cuss how weather impacts the economy if fertility choice is fully a Malthusian preventive
check. In this case, a good weather shock hurts the industrialization of a small open
economy, while it is a blessing for industrialization for a closed economy. For a small open
economy, it can be shown that the increase in fertility will be lower than that in farmland,
following a good weather shock. Therefore, the small open economy will always specialize
in agriculture, which is bad for its development. For a closed economy, a good weather
shock also increases the farmland. This is initially a blessing because the relative price
of food will drop, which is good for industrialization as argued by Rostow (1960) and
Nurkse (1953). Subsequently, although the fertility rate increases due to the Malthusian
preventive check (lower relative price of food, pt), it increases less than the amount of
farmland, resulting in lower relative price of food. This is still good for industrialization.
The following proposition summarizes the discussions made above about farmland,
fertility choice, weather and comparative advantage.
Proposition 1 All else equal, given an increase in farmland, initially, a small open econ-
omy has higher farmland per capita. This results in comparative advantage in agriculture.
If fertility choice is fully a Malthusian preventive check as in Strulik and Weisdorf (2008),
subsequently, the increase in fertility will be smaller than that in farmland. Therefore, the
small open economy will always have higher farmland per capita (lower relative price of
food) and thus comparative advantage in agriculture. Then a good weather shock will hurt
the industrialization of the small open economy, while it promotes the industrialization of
a closed economy.
2.2 Weather, fertility rate, per capita farmland, and growth
It is obvious that the quantity and quality of farmland would be directly a¤ected by
weather conditions. Good weather conditions (like more rainfall and higher temperature)
would directly raise the quantity and quality farmland. Therefore, it is natural for us
to assume that  t =  t (Wt) where Wt stands for good weather, with  0 > 0. That is,
better weather conditions increase the amount of farmland. Better weather (more rainfall
and higher temperature) is good for the quality and quantity of land within some range.
It is also possible that rainfall may be too much and temperature may be too high for
agriculture as is case in tropical African countries studied by Bloom and Sachs (1998).
Therefore, bad weather in our paper refers to situations in which there is little rainfall and
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low temperature and those in which there is too much rainfall and too high temperature.
Since for the extreme cases in which there is too much rainfall and too high temperature,
one only needs to assume that  t =  t (Wt) where Wt stands for bad weather like too
much rainfall and too high temperature, with  0 < 0. In the following, we mainly focus on
analyzing  0 > 0. The predictions would be straightforward with  0 < 0, which is omitted.
What is less known is the e¤ect of weather on fertility choice. There is no established
empirical evidence on the relationship between weather/climate and fertility rate. There-
fore, we di¤erentiate among three cases for  =  (Wt): (1) 0 = 0, which means there
is no direct e¤ect of weather/climate on fertility choice; (2) 0 < 0, which means better
weather conditions directly decrease peoples desire for more children; (3) 0 > 0, which
means better weather conditions directly increase peoples desire for more children. Stru-
lik and Weisdorf (2008) argue that the variation in the taste for children may be related
with latitude. One important feature of latitude is weather condition. The following
examines the relationship between weather and economic development, and that between
per capita farmland and economic development.
The rst case (i.e., 0 = 0) has already been studied in the previous section. The
predictions have been summarized in proposition 1. The predictions of the second case
(i.e., 0 < 0) would be the same as those (in proposition 1) in the rst case. A positive
weather shock has two opposing e¤ects on fertility rate. The rst e¤ect is through in-
creasing the amount of farmland. This agricultural advantage, according to equation (5),
will cause the relative price of food (pt) to decrease. This, by decreasing the denominator
in equation (1), will increase fertility rate one-for-one. The second e¤ect is that better
weather will change peoples taste for children by making them demand for less o¤spring
( decreases). This will decrease the numerator in equation (1), which decreases fertil-
ity rate. Therefore, the increase in fertility rate would be smaller than that in farmland,
yielding higher per capita farmland for the next period than that before the shock. Higher
per capita farmland means a unit area of farmland needs to support fewer people, which,
again according to equation (5), will cause the relative price of food to decrease. This
will intensify the initial trade pattern for this small open economy: it will continue to
have a comparative advantage in agriculture. But this turns out to be a curse since the
engine of growth is learning-by-doing in manufacturing. More total farmland is a curse,
as predicted by Matsuyama (1992), and it does not matter whether one di¤erentiates
between total and per capita farmland. Therefore, it does not matter whether we model
fertility choice fully as a Malthusian preventive check as in Strulik and Weisdorf (2008)
as in the rst case or as that better weather conditions directly decrease peoples desire
for more children (i.e., 0 < 0), the model predicts the same as the Matsuyama (1992)
model that neglects fertility choice. Moreover, in either case, a good weather shock hurts
the industrialization of a small open economy, while it is a blessing for a closed economy.
For the third case (i.e., 0 > 0), the following proposition presents the new predictions
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concerning weather, farmland, fertility choice and comparative advantage.
Proposition 2 All else equal, following a positive shock in weather, initially the amount
of farmland will increase. This results in comparative advantage in agriculture for the
small open economy. If besides Malthusian preventive check as in Strulik and Weisdorf
(2008), peoples taste for children is directly increased by weather, subsequently, the in-
crease in fertility will be larger than that in farmland. Resultantly, the population pressure
causes the small open economy to have lower farmland per capita (higher relative price
of food) and thus comparative advantage in manufacturing. A good weather shock pro-
motes its economic development, and per capita farmland is the precise channel at play.
In contrast, in a closed economy, a good weather shock is a curse for its industrialization.
Proof. Suppose originally the small open economy is identical to the world economy
(including per capita farmland and the employment share of manufacturing). We begin
our analysis with an exogenous shock in weather condition, W , and we suppose the shock
increase W0 to 2W0. Upon impact, suppose price adjusts faster than fertility, then the
small open economy will have comparative advantage in agriculture since it has lower
relative price of food. Subsequently, to see clearly how the economy of a small open
economy relatively evolves over time, that is, to see how fertility responds to the shock in
weather, we again combine equations (1) and (5) to eliminate the relative price of food:
nt =
G0 (1  t)
MtF 0 (t)
  (Wt)
Lt
  (Wt) (10.2)
which is similar to equation (10.1). However, since 0 > 0, equation (10.2) shows that
the increase in fertility rate ( (2W0)   (2W0)) is larger than that in the amount of
land ( (2W0)), following a double in weather condition. The positive weather shock has
two e¤ects on fertility rate. One is through increasing the amount of farmland. This
agricultural advantage, according to equation (5), will cause the relative price of food (pt)
to decrease. This, by decreasing the denominator in equation (1), will increase fertility
rate one-for-one. The other is that better weather will change peoples taste for children
by making them demand for more o¤spring ( increases). This will increase the numerator
in equation (1), which further increases fertility rate. The increase in fertility rate is larger
than that in farmland, yielding lower per capita farmland for the next period than that
before the shock. Lower per capita farmland means a unit area of farmland needs to
support more people, which, again according to equation (5), will cause the relative price
of food to increase. This will reverse the initial trade pattern for this small open economy:
it will have a comparative disadvantage in agriculture. But this turns out to be a blessing
since the engine of growth is learning-by-doing in manufacturing.
The above discussion depends on the adjustment speed of fertility and that of t.
It is helpful to compare with the case of 0 = 0, that is, weather has no direct e¤ect
9
on fertility, in subsection 2.1.2. Following a double in weather conditions, the increase in
fertility is smaller than that in farmland, which makes the small open economy always have
higher per capita farmland than the rest of world. Hence, it will always have comparative
advantage in agriculture. In contrast, with 0 > 0, as long as the e¤ect from the change
in t on fertility rate does not dominate that from , the small open economy would soon
have lower per capita farmland than the rest of the world because its fertility increase
more than that in farmland. This yields comparative disadvantage in agriculture for the
small open economy: a blessing from better weather.
Now it is important to di¤erentiate between total farmland and per capita farmland.
Although the amount of total farmland increases following the positive weather shock,
there is no total farmland curse. This is because subsequent population increases more
than total farmland, which results in lower per capita farmland. By specializing manu-
facturing, the small open economy has higher growth.
For a closed economy, a good weather shock is initially a blessing as discussed. How-
ever, subsequently, the fertility rate will also increase due to the Malthusian preventive
check (lower relative price of food, pt) and weathers direct e¤ect on peoples taste for chil-
dren (higher ). Fertility increases more than the amount of farmland, resulting in lower
per capita farmland (we term this as population pressure). This concurs with Malthus
(1798, ch.1, p.13)
The power of population is indenitely greater than the power in the earth
to produce subsistence for man. Population, when unchecked, increases in
a geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio. A
slight acquaintance with numbers will show the immensity of the rst power
in comparison with the second.
Next period, per capita farmland will be lower than that before the weather shock,
which through competition in labor market yields higher relative price of food. In other
words, the farmland needs to feed a relatively larger population. Food demand exceeds
food supply, pushing up the relative price of food to be higher than before the shock.
This hurts industrialization because fewer resources can be released from agriculture to
the manufacturing sector (Nurkse, 1953; Rostow, 1960). Therefore, a good weather shock
is a curse in a closed economy. The prediction of a good weather curse in a closed economy
is not surprising. Clark (2007, ch. 1) describes how the Malthusian logic applies to the
pre-1800 Easter Island society,10 a closed economy that may collapse due to population
pressure. Moreover, people might ght for the wind-fall from good weather (Miguel et
10de la Croix and Dottori (2008, p. 28) state: "Easter Island had a rising population and a prosperous
civilization until about the XVth century, after which it declined sharply. The most popular sign of that
past glory is moai, the enormous statues carved in stone and erected all over the island by the inhabitants.
By the XVIIIth century,..., the population had been decimated. Easter Island is therefore an example of
how a closed system can collapse, but what exactly happened is still an unresolved matter."
10
al., 2003), causing social conict. Social conict has been shown to hurt development
(Easterly and Levine, 1997; Rodrik, 1998). Together, they imply that good weather hurts
growth through institutional conict. In contrast, the mechanism in our model mimics
Malthus(1798) population pressure and directly shows good weather hurts growth in a
closed economy where institutional conict is non-existent. Q.E.D.
To recap, given  0 > 0 (i.e., better weather conditions increase the amount of farm-
land) and 0 > 0 (i.e., better weather conditions directly increase peoples desire for more
children), for a small open economy, higher per capita farmland is a curse because it
decreases the relative price of food and this way generates comparative advantage in agri-
culture. Better weather lowers per capita farmland because it increases fertility rate more
than it raises the amount of farmland. Lower per capita farmland (i.e. higher population
pressure) increases the relative price of food and thusly causes the small open economy
to have comparative advantage in manufacturing. It is neither population nor farmland
via which weather impacts growth. Their combination per capita farmland  is the
channel through which weather impacts growth. And in this case, a good weather shock
promotes the economic development of a small open economy, and per capita farmland
is the precise channel at play. For a closed economy, a good weather shock would be a
curse for its industrialization.
In contrast, when 0 = 0 or 0 < 0 (i.e., better weather conditions either have no e¤ect
on peoples desire for more children or directly decrease peoples taste for more children),
better weather increases per capita farmland because it increases fertility rate less than
it raises the amount of farmland. This would result in higher per capita farmland. In
a closed economy, higher per capita farmland (i.e. lower population pressure) decreases
the relative price of food, which relieves the "food problem" (Schultz, 1953, 1968) and
thereby promotes industrialization. A good weather shock would be a blessing for the
industrialization of a closed economy. However, in a small open economy, higher per
capita farmland decreases the relative price of food and thereby causes the small open
economy to have comparative advantage in agriculture. It is either the amount of farmland
or population density the channel through which weather impacts growth. And in either
case, a good weather shock retards the economic development of a small open economy.
3 Possible Extensions and Empiric Implications
3.1 Possible extensions
The previous sections generate the link between weather and fertility by assumption.
Ideally, we can model it as an equilibrium outcome as is done in most recent micro-
founded neo-Malthusian models (see, e.g., Ashraf and Galor, forthcoming). The simplest
way to implement this would be to allow for a land-quality technologyparameter in
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the agricultural production function that responds positively to weather conditions. A
positive weather shock would then cause an increase in the marginal product of labor
economy-wide (i.e., in both sectors of the economy due to the competitive nature of the
labor market), and the resultant increase in household income would confer an income
e¤ect on the desired number of children. The one issue that one will need to be aware
of from implementing this strategy is that the positive weather shock will result in an
immediate inter-sectoral reallocation of labor away from manufacturing to agriculture
until wage rates are equalized across sectors. This will tend to dampen our result in
equation (10.2) that, following a positive weather shock, the increase in fertility is larger
than the increase in farmland, but we think the desired result could be restored with
reasonable assumptions on functional properties.
As one can see, many theoretical results in the third case hinge critically on its Malthu-
sian feature that fertility rates respond positively to good weather conditions due to the
decline in the relative price of food (that arises from an expansion in farmland per capita).
However, it is important to examine whether the results are robust when we account for
the importance of human capital accumulation during the process of industrialization, as
Unied Growth Theory suggests we should. Specically, parental preferences are aug-
mented to allow for a quality-quantity trade-o¤ over children (see, e.g., Becker and Lewis,
1973; Galor and Weil, 2000) and manufacturing production is more realistically mod-
eled as being skill-intensive. Then it may not necessarily be the case that the fertility
rate will increase following a good weather shock. In the closed-economy case, the initial
benecial e¤ect of the shock on industrialization (as a result of relaxing food-availability
constraints) will continue to persist in contrast to the prediction of the current model.
The initial surge in industrialization will raise the demand for human capital, which will,
in turn, result in endogenous household substitutions of child quantity for quality. This
will not only prevent an increase in population (and thus prevent a lowering of farmland
per capita and a concomitant decline in relative food prices, thereby allowing industrial-
ization to proceed), but it will further fuel industrialization due to the resultant increase
in the supply of skilled labor. Moreover, given such an augmented model, the predictions
for the small open-economy case may be ambiguous. On the one hand, since relative
food prices will not necessarily decline following a good weather shock, the agricultural
sector may continue to maintain its comparative advantage. As such, good weather may
continue to remain a curse for a small open economy. On the other hand, given the initial
increase in the demand for skilled workers (due to the expansion of industry), comparative
advantage may switch to the manufacturing sector, depending on the complementarity
between skilled labor and physical capital in manufacturing and the elasticity of child-
quality with respect to household income. Therefore, it is more meaningful to empirically
identify whether good weather is a blessing for a small open economy, which is briey
examined in the next section.
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3.2 Implication for empirics
Recently, Galor et al. (2008) emphasize that equality vs. inequality of the distribution of
land ownership instead of abundance vs. scarcity of land matters for development: The
theory further suggests that some land abundant countries that were characterized by an
unequal distribution of land, were overtaken in the process of industrialization by land
scarce countries in which land distribution was rather equal.Nevertheless, one can also
interpret the phenomenon as a curse from land abundance. Land endowment is entangled
with its distribution in real world. Therefore, empirically, it would be ideal to nd a
natural experiment in which one can control for the distribution of land when examining
the role of land abundance in development.
Further, unlike mineral resources that took millions of years to form, agricultural re-
sources are likely to be endogenous. Overcoming their potential endogeneity poses one
challenge for empirics. Existing theory neglecting weather cannot predict how weather
a¤ects agricultural resource and whether agricultural resource is the channel for weather
to impact development. It is, therefore, not clear whether weather provides a valid in-
strument to overcome the endogeneity of agricultural resource in examining its role in
development. According to the third case of our model, weather a¤ects the quantity and
quality of farmland as well as peoples taste for children. The variation in weather con-
ditions is exogenous to the growth process. Since we have pinned down the channel, per
capita farmland, it works on growth, we can empirically test the e¤ect of per capita farm-
land on growth, using weather conditions as instruments. However, there is a debate over
the channel of causality between geography including climate and economic development.
Some show that geography directly a¤ects development (Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Sachs
et al., 1998). Others focus on the channel and have identied it as past events/institution
(Acemoglu et al., 2001; Sokolo¤ and Engerman, 2000). Given the other potential chan-
nels and the possibility that weather may directly impact growth, weather may not be
valid as an instrument. This imposes a dilemma for instrumental variable regressions that
attempts to overcome the potential endogeneity problem of farmland abundance.
As discussed, without solid empirical evidence on the direct relationship between
weather/climate conditions and fertility rate, it is more appealing to resort to empiri-
cal work to test the di¤erent theoretical predictions. We take the predictions for a small
open economy as examples. In the small open economy, as already discussed, Matsuyama
(1992), rst of all, does not di¤erentiate the two-dimensions of land: quality and quantity,
so the curse he predicts could be a quantity one or a quality one. Moreover, Matsuyama
neglects fertility choice, which is similar to our rst case in which weather has no direct
e¤ect on peoples taste for children. Therefore, the existence of a land quality curse would
favor the Matsuyama model.
In the second case in which weather has a direct negative e¤ect on peoples taste for
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children, the predictions would be the same as if farmland was not a¤ected by weather
(although it is not true in real world) and weather a¤ects only peoples taste on chil-
dren. Therefore, it is appealing to check whether population density rather than quality-
adjusted farmland per capita is the channel by which weather a¤ects growth. The recip-
rocal of population density is total land per capita (i.e., total land area of a province
divided by its population as in Sachs and Warner, 1997; Stijns, 2000), so a regression
with ln(Population Density) is the same as one with ln(total land per capita). The exis-
tence of a population density blessing (or a total land per capita curse) in a small open
economy would support the second case.
In contrast, to test the third case in which weather has a direct positive e¤ect on
peoples taste for children, one needs to construct quality-adjusted farmland per capita.
This is because in this case, it is neither population nor farmland, instead it is per capita
farmland (farmland divided by population) the channel through which weather impacts
growth. Quality-adjusted farmland per capita is the product of the area of farmland
and the quality of farmland divided by population. This measure is not total area of a
province divided by population as in Sachs and Warner (1995) and Stijns (2000) in testing
the second case. In addition, they incorporate the quality of land. Previous empirical
measures of land overlook the quality of land (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Stijns, 2000).
However, a quantity measure of land without controlling for the quality of land would
be subject to interpretation problem: a quantity curse could be interpreted as a quality
blessing. For instance, Canada and Russia may on average have higher per capita area
of farmland. It may be simply because their land quality is low as is the case in Canada
and Russia. Nevertheless, the existence of a quality-adjusted per capita farmland curse
would support the third case.
If ideally one can nd suitable measures for all three cases, one can further put the
quality of land, population density, and quality-adjusted farmland per capita in the re-
gressions to test whose estimated coe¢ cient would be signicant in promoting economic
growth. In so doing, which of the three cases is supported by data would be identied.
4 Conclusions
To examine the role of land abundance in the economic development of a small open
economy, we introduce fertility choice into Matsuyama (1992). The model structure
follows Strulik and Weisdorf (2008). It is a two-period overlapping generation model with
two production sectors: agriculture and manufacturing. The engine of growth is learning-
by-doing in manufacturing. People have quasi-linear preference on children. If besides the
Malthusian preventive check in Strulik and Weisdorf (that is, fertility only responds to
the relative price of food that is determined by the amount of farmland), peoples taste for
o¤spring is either directly una¤ected or directly decreased by good weather, then the main
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predictions of the model would be the same as those from Matsuyama. In particular, good
weather would be a curse for a small open economy, although it is a blessing for a closed
economy. If besides the Malthusian preventive check in Strulik and Weisdorf, peoples
taste for o¤spring is directly increased by weather. The model predicts the following.
Higher per capita farmland (i.e. lower population pressure) is good for the industri-
alization of a closed economy, because the relative price of food that negatively depends
on per capita farmland is low and thus more resources can be released from agriculture
to manufacturing as argued by Rostow (1960) and Nurkse (1953). In contrast, higher per
capita farmland hurts the industrialization of a small open economy. This is because the
lower relative price of food causes the small open economy to have comparative advan-
tage in agriculture. Given the source of growth is learning-by-doing in manufacturing, the
specialization in agriculture hurts its industrialization. These support Starvianos (2005)
who argues that one reason why the west rst began modern industrial civilization is that
their land resources were relatively scarce comparing to leading agricultural civilizations
such as China and India. That is, higher population pressure in the west pushes up the
relative price of food, which coupled with international trade causes the west to have
comparative advantage in industrial production that is the engine of modern growth.
When weather conditions improve, they directly increase the amount of farmland
(quantity times quality), which immediately causes the relative price of food to decrease.
Subsequently, the improvement in weather conditions has two e¤ects on fertility. The
rst is indirect and achieved through the increase in farmland. The increase in farmland
will cause the relative price of food to decrease, which will increase fertility rate one-
for-one as in Strulik and Weisdorf. The second is weathers direct e¤ect on increasing
peoples taste on o¤spring, which increases the fertility rate further. The increase in
fertility rate is larger than that in farmland, resulting in lower per capita farmland (higher
population pressure). This concurs with Malthus (1798) who argues population increases
in a geometrical ratio and subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio. Lower per
capita farmland causes the relative price of food to increase, resultantly, the small open
economy will have comparative disadvantage in agriculture. A good weather shock is a
blessing by yielding comparative advantage in manufacturing for a small open economy.
Both Matsuyama (1992) who neglect fertility choice and Strulik and Weisdorf (2008) who
model fertility choice fully as a Malthus preventive check would predict that better weather
would cause the small open economy to have comparative advantage in agriculture. In
summary, even if land distribution may be important (Galor et al., 2008), the quantity of
land still matters for development.
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